Case study, uncomfortable realities and some recommendations

Western Electronics in Foreign Skies: The Drone Dilemma

Is there anything we can do about Western electronics in non-western military drones worldwide?

17 min readNov 27, 2023

Opinion co-authored by Andreas Voigt and Nicolas Brieger

In the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a revelation sent shockwaves through the international community: A number of Western components were discovered in the HESA Shahed 136, an Iranian-made suicide drone (“loitering munitions”) extensively used by Russian forces — and not only in that one. There was widespread outrage, especially among Ukrainians and the ethics of Western technology finding its way into conflict zones and fueling the machinery of war were questioned. In war, every advantage given to the enemy is a disadvantage to your side. The outcry serves the dual purpose of rallying public opinion and potentially disrupting supply chains, if only temporarily.

Video about Western components in the Shahed 13 by Trap Agressor, a project of Ukrainian NGO StateWatch

But there’s a question at the back of our minds: Should we really be surprised that these components have found their way into an opponent’s drones or is there a more complex, perhaps uncomfortable, reality hidden? Join us as we dive into this modern dilemma, where the lines between toys and the military, between friend and foe, are unfortunately more blurred than ever.

The Rise of the Off-The-Shelf-Drone

This chapter for the busy reader:

Developments outside of the drone sector, especially in consumer electronics, have driven the rise of drones due to cheap and ubiquitous electronic components
Often those developments were driven by western developers, ensuring the presence of western (designed) components in drones
Open-source projects, again driven by western enthusiasts, enabled rapid advancements in bootstrapped military unmanned aircraft programs

Over the past decade, small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) haven’t just taken off; they’ve become a disruptive force in the civilian sector, and the armed forces are now reaping the benefits. One of the most powerful catalysts for this rapid rise has been advances in industries like consumer electronics; markets outside the drone world. As those have pushed the boundaries of what’s possible — developing ever more powerful, smaller and cheaper semiconductors, sensors and batteries. There are several factors outside and inside the drone sector that have collectively led to increasingly capable drones, and we will explore them in this chapter.

*Size comparison of an inertial measurement unit (IMU) for a ballistic missile and an smartphone-derived IMU used in autopilots for small drones*

The mobile phone industry has played a key role in the miniaturisation of semiconductors, micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) and cameras. While Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) in the 60s were the size of a basketball, the MEMS IMUs of today are measured in single digit millimetres. These advances have been rapidly repurposed for use in unmanned aerial systems, contributing to their cost effectiveness and ease of development. It’s a trend that has turned once-prohibitively expensive technologies into accessible tools. The components that turn a smartphone into a pocket-sized powerhouse are now the same ones that pilot drones through increasingly complex tasks, forming the core of inertial navigation systems and optical recognition hardware.

At the same time, consumer electronics industries have made significant advances in battery technology — improvements in energy density, charge cycles and safety features have been particularly notable. This has made batteries from these sectors ideal for use in UAS, reducing costs and increasing flight times — by the way a development that we have also seen in electromobility, initially based on the same advances.

The possibilities for reuse go beyond components — entire consumer products often find an unexpected second life in unmanned systems. Take, for example, the use of consumer cameras for aerial photography. What was once a device for capturing family memories can now be used for high-altitude reconnaissance or landscape mapping. Similarly, chainsaw engines originally designed to cut down trees are now being used to power drones. Such ingenuity demonstrates the flexibility of off-the-shelf components, blurring the lines between consumer products and dedicated drone hardware.

Another key factor is the interchangeability of off-the-shelf components, something which will be central to our later arguments. This modularity is actively sought by industry players in all sectors to reduce costs, and is characterised by the adoption of common interfaces, footprints and electrical characteristics across components. Such standardisation enables seamless integration, making it easier for designers to swap one component for another without having to redesign entire systems which facilitates the rapid development and pace of innovation. The result for drones is a diverse and flexible UAS ecosystem that not only accommodates but encourages modularity and interchangeability. Hence, creating an environment for rapid specialization for certain tasks.

The role of open source platforms, hardware and software in this landscape also cannot be overstated — look into the rise of the ArduPilot ecosystem for more information. They accelerate the development and deployment of unmanned aerial systems by essentially democratising access to advanced technologies. They enable rapid iteration and customisation, allowing even small teams or individual enthusiasts to contribute to the field. And just as Linux revolutionised the software world, they are doing the same for drones.

The open source repository of ArduPilot, just one of many open source autopilot software packages available online, has been forked 14,900 times into new projects, a testament to its international role.

Open source projects often by necessity rely on the recombination of readily available, commercial-grade components — many of which are made in the West — because of their proven reliability, extensive documentation and easy availability. This creates a feedback loop: as more people use and improve these open source designs, the demand for the interchangeable, often Western, components they use increases, further cementing their presence in the global drone ecosystem.

All of those individual points combine into a symbiotic relationship that has made advanced drone technology not just a reality, but a readily accessible one — worldwide.

The phenomenon of technological cross-pollination adds another layer of complexity to this already complex landscape. Advances in one area of unmanned aviation often have spillover effects that benefit other areas. For example, improvements in autonomous flight algorithms, sensor technology and ground control stations are not limited to small multi-rotor drones, but can also be applied to larger, non-electric unmanned systems — and even if they are, they further advance the general ecosystem which benefits all drone types. This kind of cross-disciplinary innovation acts as a catalyst, accelerating progress across the board.

In sum, the very architecture of the modern drone industry, from its inception, has made the presence of “Western” components in unmanned aerial systems an inevitability rather than an anomaly, something that has been foreshadowed by insurgencies worldwide — see the Islamic State model aircraft part shopping lists. The lines between consumer electronics and drone technology have been so thoroughly blurred that it’s no longer a question of whether these components will appear in drones worldwide, but rather when and where. The case of the Shahed 136, which we will delve into in the next chapter, is an illustration of this new reality.

HESA Shahed 136 / Geran-2

This chapter for busy reader:

The massive use of Western components in the Shahed 136 and its indiscriminate use against civilians kicked off investigations
Based on this there are understandable demands for export controls
The incriminated components in the Shahed 136, however, are basic and maybe even easily replaced

The HESA Shahed 136, an Iranian-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicle, serves as a compelling case study in the complexities of modern drone warfare. Part of Iran’s Shahed series, the drone is originally designed for long-endurance missions, often equipped with advanced surveillance equipment like cameras. Yet, its primary function nowadays is darker: it acts as a one-way delivery system for explosives.

Remains of Shahed 136 and its engine in Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise, Source

The Russo-Ukrainian war saw the Shahed 136 used by Russian forces under the name of Geran-2. Originally imported from Iran for use in Russia’s various theatres of war — or conflict, or un-official involvement, depending on who you ask each time — throughout the Middle East, it has been used extensively in Ukraine and there is speculation that the drone may now be manufactured by Russia itself to secure their supply chain. The Geran-2 has been used to indiscriminately attack civilian population centres in Ukraine — a tactic that is not only morally indefensible but also of course raises urgent questions about the ethical dimensions of drone warfare.

When it comes to the Shahed 136’s inner workings, it’s its composition that is most striking. According to reliable sources and based on the analysis of crashed drones, it is equipped with a variety of Western-designed — and in some cases, Western-manufactured — components. Some examples of the more than 30 components that were identified from debris are provided in the table below, for a longer list see Appendix 1.

Examples of Western components found in the HESA Shahed 136 — and a potential replacement for each part as a first taste of why banning controlling the export of the incriminated components might not be a feasible solution as argued in the next chapters

The presence of these components raised a number of questions, not least of which is how Western technology got into a drone used in such a controversial conflict.

Western Components in the Drone of Your Opponent are Unpreventable

This chapter for the busy reader:

The history of the rise of drones makes Western components in any newly developed mass-produced drone highly likely
Unfortunately, the typical instruments of export controls does not work in this instance as those components are not specialized enough
On top of that, most of those components have replacements from non-Western competitors
While forcing drone manufacturers to use those would “solve” the issue of Western components in military drones, this does not solve the core issue of military drone usage

The presence of Western components in drones like the Shahed 136 is less a shocking revelation than an inevitable consequence of the very architecture of the drone industry. The very nature of off-the-shelf components, which we’ve already established as the backbone of the drone revolution, ensures their global distribution. These are not specialised, hard-to-find items; they’re the same components that power your smartphone, your laptop, maybe even your car. These also are not large, easily tracked items like jet engines, or highly complex ones like inertial navigation systems: Given their ubiquity and small size, controlling component distribution is a Sisyphean task that is not just difficult but almost impossible.

The complexity of global supply chains further complicates any attempt to control where these components end up. Most industries, from automotive to consumer electronics, source their components from a network of suppliers that spans continents. This is not a black market of illicit goods; it’s everyday commerce — even if used as a front. And as China and other countries around the world catch up in the semiconductor race, these components, even if they have no non-Western equivalent now, will increasingly have one — because semiconductors are the one area where that may still be the case from our experience.

While it’s true that some technical measures can be implemented to restrict the use of certain components in undesirable scenarios, these measures are far from foolproof. For instance, Inertial Measurement Units that exceed specific performance thresholds are subject to export controls under international law. Similarly, modern photocopiers come with software that prevents the duplication of banknotes. Take, also for example, the commercial GNSS receivers commonly found in these drones which often come with software restrictions to prevent their use in missiles or other weapons.

*Printers are programmed to either refuse copying money or deliberately make the result unusable — for example by doing only partial copies, as seen on the top of the image.* *Source*

This presents us with a tricky problem. Most of the components are generic and, in themselves, relatively harmless. They’re the same chips, sensors and batteries that power our smartphones and laptops. The software is openly available. Tracking and controlling the use of these widely available components is a Herculean task, not unlike the challenges of cybersecurity. Just as encryption technology can be used for both privacy and nefarious activities, drone components can be used for a range of applications, from powering smartphones to drones delivering coffee or explosives — one-way. This ubiquity and dual-use nature of drone components makes them from our point of view almost impossible to regulate effectively.

*The electronics of toy robots are remarkably similar to what is used in small drones.* *Source*

Let us however assume that we can do all this: We can implement perfect export controls on Western components, through this prevent their use in military drones and therefore solve the issue that prompted the writing of this article. But: Does this really solve the core issue, which is drones hitting civilians indiscriminately? Unfortunately — no, due to technical reasons and due to the operational usefulness of drones which will prompt re-development and re-engineering.

The technical reason for why export controls will not solve the problem is component interchangeability. Manufacturers often design their products to be easily interchangeable, sometimes even creating components as direct drop-in replacements for more expensive counterparts from competitors. This is especially true for fully generic components like capacitors, resistors, and basic semiconductors, which are almost like the building blocks of the electronic world. Even for more complex semiconductors, standardized interfaces, programming languages or at the very least cross-compatible software compilers have been created that enable you to drop in replacements for components that are obsolete and not available any more.

*Low drop-out voltage regulators from rivaling companies Microchip and Texas Instruments that are pin-compatible replacements of each other*

This is equally true for the devices that were mentioned above that have built-in technical limitations. Manufacturers in other parts of the world produce similar devices without such restrictions. In the case of GNSS receivers, alternative positioning satellite networks can be tapped for navigation data that are not subject to US regulations. All of this is doubly true if you are able to write your own software.

While it is true that some industries face challenges in the obsolescence crisis, where companies scramble to find alternatives for discontinued components, this argument doesn’t carry much weight in the context of modern drones used in conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian war. Those drones were largely developed within the last decade, using the latest design principles, technology and components and are not relics relying on obsolete parts. In total, the ready availability of replacements is unfortunately a factor that prevents (export) bans on individual components from having long-term effects.

Rather than concentrating on the origin of components, it would be from our point of view more productive to shift the conversation to a broader view. These include the challenges of controlling the proliferation of drones and ensuring their responsible use, issues we’ve raised in discussions about regulation and international cooperation. By refocusing the dialogue in this way, we should try to systematically address the core issue, and perhaps find a more effective path to responsible drone use — as far as those words can be true for weapons of war.

The Real Issue: Arms Control in the Age of Drones

This chapter for the busy reader:

Up until now a central lever of arms control was trying to prevent your opponents from acquiring certain functions — something that does not really work with drones, as established
Export controls might work on a subset of components and in general to disrupt the short-term supply chain of drones but has little to no long-term effect
The problem needs to be tackled at all levels simultaneously but fundamentally through government cooperation and international agreements

The real issue goes beyond the mere presence of Western components in enemy drones; it touches on a fundamental shift in the nature of arms and proliferation. Gone are the days when the focus of armed forces was on producing large, expensive systems that only a handful of nations could afford. This democratisation of precision weapons means that even the smallest nations can now build their own advanced weapons programmes at a fraction of the traditional cost, which comes with a set of challenges in general, even more so for drones.

The internet has also decentralized access to the knowledge and tools needed to build drones, further complicating the regulatory landscape. Detailed plans and instructions are readily available online, often in open source formats that invite collaboration and rapid innovation. This accessibility extends not only to hardware but, crucially, to software. Indeed, the importance of software to drone functionality has begun to overshadow hardware, making the task of regulation even more daunting. With code repositories and software blueprints just a click away, the barriers to entry into drone development have never been lower. This ease of access to both hardware and software resources makes it difficult to control who is building drones and for what purpose.

*The open source drone ground control station software Mission Planner is widely used during drone development — and even for Ukrainian military drones as shown in one of our last articles*

All of this combined with the high asymmetry of drone warfare — where it’s far easier to use drones than to defend against them — makes it likely that more and more countries will choose to develop their own UAS capabilities. This new kind of arms race is not only reshaping military strategies, and the use of drones in Ukraine is being closely observed by armed forces all over the world; it’s also raising urgent questions about arms control in an age where the barriers to entry have been dramatically lowered and the lines between civilian and military components are blurring.

The question now is — what do we do?

Unfortunately, traditional export control principles are ill-suited to the drone age. Historically, export controls have focused on two primary filters: the function of the technology and its technical specifications. In the case of preventing support for an adversaries’ intercontinental ballistic missile programme, for example, the focus might be on controlling the export of specialised engines and navigation systems.

The technical requirements for building drones are however much lower than for more complex systems such as intercontinental ballistic missiles. As a result, drones can be assembled from basic components that are used in a wide range of other ‘innocent’ applications — the inertial measurement unit in a drone could just as easily be used in a toy robot or a mobile phone. The specifications of such common electronics almost completely overlap between the technical components of drones and those used in other applications, which prevents both the functional and specification filter from working. The only exceptions where those filters do work are some (critical) components such as infrared cameras and encrypted long-distance data links, components for which, however, non-Western alternatives are at least in the development pipeline or on the market already.

Given this new landscape, it’s clear that we urgently need a new approach for export control in the drone sector. The old methods of technical regulation and segregation are not effective here. The challenge now is to develop a framework that can effectively regulate the proliferation of drones without stifling innovation in completely unrelated sectors or choking the flow of global trade.

Coming back to the core of the issue, the ease of use for drone technology and its ubiquitous components requires for our point of view a new level of international cooperation for effective regulation. While the export of certain specialised components, e.g. infrared cameras or some MEMS IMUs, is already or might be monitored or restricted as part of a layered defence approach, the effectiveness of such measures as a broad measure is questionable, as this article argues.

*Review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on the topic of autonomous weapons systems.* *Source*

The problem must therefore be tackled at multiple levels simultaneously. This includes international cooperation to establish global norms and regulations on the actual use of drones in conflicts, market-level interventions to influence the economics of drone production, supply chain scrutiny to track the flow of very specific components, and technical measures to limit the capabilities of certain parts — hopefully without at the same time disrupting the ever-increasing usage of drones in sectors like surveying and agriculture.

However, international cooperation should also go beyond mere control. Joint tracking of drone use in conflict zones, and publishing of such data, could provide information for understanding the scope and impact of drone proliferation, worldwide. Shared research into counter-drone technologies could also be a fruitful avenue, offering a proactive approach to mitigating the risks associated with drone use.

The genie is out of the bottle, and there’s no turning back the clock on drone technology. The focus of international discourse must shift from whether this technology will be used to how it should be used responsibly. Given the challenges and limitations of traditional export controls, a multi-faceted, cooperative approach is the only viable way forward — the first small steps have been taken, just not with the drive we think is necessary.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the presence of Western components in drones used by military adversaries is not only likely, it is inevitable in the sense of us not being able to effectively prevent it. This inevitability is a by-product of a variety of factors, including the drone industry’s reliance on advances in mass-market sectors and the widespread adoption of open-source software. While the ubiquity of these components may be a cause for concern, it is also a reflection of the interconnected world in which we live — a world that has seen rapid technological advances, in part due to the very factors that make this issue so complex.

To be clear, we’re not suggesting that this state of affairs is desirable — far from it. What we are saying is that the same open market and technological ecosystem that has driven rapid developments in various industrial and consumer sectors now presents us with a new set of challenges that require collective action. The benefits all of us have reaped from this interconnectedness over the years require us to engage in an open dialogue about the way forward. This is not about pointing fingers, but about working together to find solutions to a problem that, often like technology itself, knows no borders.

The question that prompted this article is an uncomfortable one: How can we prevent these components from falling into the wrong hands? The sobering answer is that, given the current landscape, it’s almost impossible. Even if a way could be found to disrupt short-term supply chains, the modular and interchangeable nature of drone technology means that most banned components can be quickly replaced.

What can realistically be regulated is not the individual parts, but the use of the drone itself. For example, incorporating drones into existing international agreements such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons could be a viable way forward — the foundation has been laid, results however are scarce and the UN General Assembly has recently voted in favor of addressing the challenges and concerns raised by autonomous weapons systems. The use of drones in populated centres is clearly indiscriminate, especially given their paradoxical accuracy — highly precise in targeting specific locations, but imprecise in their impact on those locations.

In light of these complexities, we advocate a broad, simultaneous approach, with international cooperation at its core. Dialogue must be pursued on all fronts — intergovernmental, market, supply chain and technical. The problem is as multifaceted as the technology itself and requires an equally comprehensive solution.

By Andreas Voigt and Nicolas Brieger. Any thoughts? Get in touch on LinkedIn!