Drones: Disruptive Innovation, Literally
Drone usage during and after the Crimean annexation
The age of drones has arrived in symmetrical armed conflict. What can we learn from this?
Note: This article was written in early 2021, before the full-scale Russian invasion of the Ukraine in 2022, and reflects the views of that time. Even though the war has progressed, all lessons remain valid or have in fact been validated by the use of drones in this war since.
Drones were used effectively by Turkey and Russia in Syria and by Azerbaijan in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh War. In that conflict, Azerbaijani TB-2 drones were responsible for the destruction of at least 22 strategic sites and large numbers of other assets, which most probably played a decisive role in the conflict as analysed in the last piece of this series. This begs the question of whether drones have played similar roles in other major symmetrical conflicts of recent years.
In March 2014, Russia annexed the formerly Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. What impact did Russia’s drones (also called Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs) and UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, unmanned combat aircraft) have on this seizure several years ago? We look back at the beginnings of the conflict as well as the drone arms race since then, a factor that is becoming increasingly important in the Ukraine conflict and even more against the backdrop of possible further Russian incursions.
Several separate conflicts are taking place in the Ukrainian-Russian border region. There was a direct confrontation between Ukraine and Russia during the annexation of the Crimea region and, with less intensity, since then. In addition, several separatist groups, some of which are supported by Russia, operate in the region and are opposed by the Ukrainian armed forces. For the purposes of this article, which is intended to focus on the use of UAVs, the political dimension is not considered, and the parallel conflicts are not separated.
The article has four main parts:
- How were drones used during the annexation?
- Who currently uses which drones — and how?
- How was drone defence approached?
- Now what?
This article is a technical analysis of the conflict in the Crimean peninsula. Tragic loss of life did happen and should be avoided at all costs, however, this article is solely intended as an analysis and has no political tendencies.
How were drones used during the annexation?
The Ukrainian forces did not have any drones on their own during the annexation in March 2014, even though at that time it had one of the largest armies in Europe, second only to Russia itself. The drones that were on the Ukrainian side were provided or even operated by US forces.
In the early stages of the conflict in March 2014, during the active phase of annexation, an incident occurred where Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine captured a US-operated MQ-5B, a type of drone manufactured in an IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries)-Northrop Grumman partnership. The drone in question was reportedly hijacked at an altitude of about 4,000 metres and forced to land almost intact. The Russian electronic warfare company Rostec quickly claimed responsibility for this success. Rostec reported that the drone belonged to the 66th American Reconnaissance Brigade based in Bavaria, Germany. The incident was denied by US officials.
However, drones were present on the Russian side. At the time of the annexation, Orlan-10 drones built by the Russian state owned St. Petersburg Special Technology Centre had been integrated into the Russian military. In fact, a modified Orlan-10 was reportedly shot down by the Ukrainian military in the early stages of the conflict on 30 May 2014. The Ukrainian intelligence service SBU claimed at the time that it was a modified Russian Orlan-10 with 3D mapping and real-time battle monitoring capabilities.
It can therefore be assumed that with regards to drones Russian forces had access to Orlan-10s when they took over the Crimean Peninsula, while Ukraine had nothing and relied on US and possibly European support. The Orlan-10s could and probably did provide vital battlefield intelligence as the Russians and Russian-backed forces took over Ukrainian ground. The number of Orlan-10s destroyed was never significant and Russia still uses them, suggesting that the intelligence and results they provide are satisfactory.
There have been several incidents in which Ukraine claimed the use of drones. By far the costliest incident was the total destruction of an ammunition depot at a military base in Balakliya in eastern Ukraine in 2017.
A drone believed to be carrying a thermite charge triggered a series of munitions explosions that caused around a billion dollars worth of damage. This follows earlier attempts in 2015 to cause similar damage when drones dropped 14 thermite charges. Firefighters were able to put out the fires then, although of course, they were not as successful in 2017.
Who currently uses which drones — and how?
There are three parties using drones in the ongoing conflict: Ukraine themselves, Russia and the forces it supports and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.
Armed Forces of Ukraine
The Armed Forces of Ukraine currently and in the past mostly used foreign-built drones although they are, at the same time, trying to establish a national supply chain and industry.
Foreign Systems: AeroVironment RQ-11 B
Despite the interception of the MQ-5Bs described above, which first entered service in 1991, more early-generation US drones were deployed to the conflict zone. In 2016 the US provided Ukraine with 72 outdated RQ-11B Raven drones with analogue data links. The Russians easily jammed or intercepted the unencrypted data links from these drones, turning the aerial vehicles into liabilities rather than force multipliers.
After this was discovered, Ukraine stopped using the drones. Nevertheless, the US unsuccessfully tried even in 2017 to train Ukrainian forces on those outdated RQ-11Bs. The Ukrainians were not eager to receive the training in the operation of a drone known to them as battlefield ineffective. However, the general advantages of drone usage were evident to the Ukrainian forces and the development of both a national drone ecosystem as well as the procurement of foreign models was initiated.
Ukrainian Systems: Luch Design Bureau Sokil
On September 14, 2017, Ukraine tested the first “Sokil”-model drones. The Sokil is a reconnaissance and attack drone that uses a system of one reconnaissance drone and three attack drones that attacks priority targets with high-explosive, blast fragmentation, or thermobaric munitions in Loitering Munitions-style attacks. The Sokil is part of the successful modernization efforts undertaken by Ukraine to have a competitive drone programme to counter Russia and other opposing forces.
Interestingly, careful analysis of the footage provided by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine shows that the Sokil uses the popular open-source ground control station software Mission Planner.
This hints at the usage of further modern open-source flight control hard- and software. This proves the possibility to rapidly advance usage of military drone technology without investing heavily into research and development. On the other hand, it implies that the release of open-source technology, especially in dual-use scenarios, might have proliferation implications that should be carefully considered.
The company also recently published the first images and a prototype of the Sokil 300 Medium Altitude Long Endurance drone which is scheduled to be finished in 2022.
Ukrainian Systems: UkrSpecSystem PD-1
The PD-1 Unmanned Aerial System is another UAV developed for Ukraine by UkrSpecSystem. The Ukraine Armed Forces purchased the UAV, which is used in aerial surveillance and reconnaissance roles, in August 2016. Not much has been heard since. It has a take-off weight of 45kg and carries a 7kg payload, is 2.5m long and has a wingspan of 4.7m which allows it to stay airborne for up to eight hours*.
Foreign Systems: Kale-Baykar Bayraktar TB-2
Turkish Arms manufacturer Kale-Baykar announced that it has delivered six more Bayraktar TB-2 UCAVs to the Ukrainian Navy on March 17, 2020, which follows an initial batch of twelve TB-2’s delivered in 2019. The TB-2 has seen battlefield success in Syria, Libya and the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war. Ukraine was reported to be in the process of purchasing more of these UCAV’s from Baykar in October 2020.
The surge of Turkish-made drones can be seen in Ukraine, too. Their procurement in 2019 suggests that the industrial advancements initiated after the initial exposure to both the Russian drones and their US counterparts were either not satisfactory or Ukraine wants to use them as a stopgap measure while they build their own industrial base.
The Bayraktar TB2 is a Medium Altitude Long Endurance Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and attack missions. The drone has a length of 6.5m, a wingspan of 12m and a maximum take-off weight of 650kg*. It has a range of more than 150km, can fly at a maximum altitude of 27,000ft, has a maximum speed ranging between 70kt and 120kt, and has an endurance of 27 hours*.
As was shown in Armenia and Syria, the TB-2 does pose a significant threat to in this case Russian tanks, infantry, and other vehicles and is apparently difficult to intercept even with modern Russian anti-air equipment. The TB-2’s are battle-proven UCAVs that posed a significant threat to Armenian forces when employed by Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh War for which the, admittedly older, Russian-built air defence systems had no answer.
Foreign Systems: IAI Bird-Eye 400
Ukraine in 2009 also purchased two IAI Bird-Eye 400 short-range UAVs from Israel. Funding shortages mean Ukraine never trained soldiers to use these and is presumably just storing them.
Russia and the forces it supports
Russia is still far ahead of Ukraine in terms of drone technology. Although it did possess drones for a long time, the strategic focus was put on their development after the experiences during their war with Georgia in 2008 where Israelian drones were used by Georgia with success.
As in other areas of military importance, Russia is focusing on building a national industry and therefore mainly uses domestically produced drones or tries to internalise foreign knowledge.
St. Petersburg Special Technology Center Orlan-10
Judging by Ukrainian figures of intercepted drones, the Orlan-10 system built by the St Petersburg Special Technology Centre appears to be the most commonly used model in this conflict. It is deployed in groups of several smaller drones with different mission configurations, ranging from reconnaissance and electronic warfare equipment to a flying relay station for the other drones in the group.
This indicates deployment in support and disruptive roles. The drone has a wingspan of about 3m and a maximum take-off weight of 18kg*. It has a range of 1000km and can fly at a maximum altitude of 16,500ft with an endurance of 16 hours*. The Orlan-10 appears to be one of the first examples of Russia’s stated goal of using drone swarms as a core element of future battlefield operations.
Forpost / Outpost (IAI Searcher)
This is a licensed copy of the IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries) Searcher, a smaller drone used for reconnaissance purposes. Drones of this model were built in Russia after a licensing agreement was signed with IAI. This agreement was used by Russia to renew the existing technological and industrial foundation in terms of drones. The cooperation was terminated by IAI in 2014 after images of intercepted Forpost drones used in Ukraine were published.
However, judging by their use in Syria, the systems appear to continue to be built by Russian companies, and further cooperation with and purchases from IAI were even announced in 2016. The drone has a wingspan of approx. 8.5m and a maximum take-off weight of 500kg*. It can fly at a maximum altitude of 20,000ft with an endurance of 18 hours*.
ZALA Aero KUB-BLA
The KUB-BLA system, which is reportedly not being used in Ukraine but currently only in Syria, is a “loitering munitions” drone built by Kalashnikov subsidiary ZALA Aero. It has a 3 kg warhead and can stay in the air for 30 minutes. It reportedly has limited autonomous capabilities to attack predefined target types. In Syria, this drone was used in swarms, something the Russian military seems to be increasingly focusing on as mentioned above. The fact that its use in Ukraine has not been reported probably indicates that the Russian military is unwilling to escalate the situation there.
Future Drones
Many different drones are in development by Russian companies. Which of those will see the light of active usage is still unclear. However, Russia has seen the strategic and tactical value of drone usage from their usage in Georgia and Syria and in external conflicts like Armenia-Azerbaijan. It is focusing not only on the existing smaller systems described above but a range of Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High-Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAV and UCAVs. Some examples are:
- The Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter) stealth UCAV with an autonomy of 6,000km and two internal weapons bays capable of carrying up to 2,000kg of unguided and guided munitions *
- The Kronshtadt Grom (Thunder) UCAV set to be used as a loyal wingman to the Sukhoi Su-35 and Su-57 fighter aircraft with a striking resemblance to the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie, an autonomy of 12,000km and 2,000 kg payload capacity *
- The Kronshtadt Sirius as the largest Russian MALE drone with a wingspan of 30m and set to be patrolling the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone in the Arctic and Pacific zones; a comparatively cheap way for power projection
Russian-supported autonomous groups in Ukraine
Apart from home-built multirotor style UAS these groups do not appear to have significant UAV capabilities. Evidence suggests that Russia and the bigger groups are working together, suggesting that they might benefit from Russian intelligence gathered through drone usage. The DPR at least is receiving financial support from Russia.
The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) under the OCSE (Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe)
The SMMs role is in monitoring the situation in Eastern Ukraine, which early on suggested the usage of reconnaissance drones. They have deployed approximately 50 drones, most of which are small fixed-wing or multirotor type drones and is leasing one long-range UAV under a civilian contract. However, as the daily reports show, their usage is constantly being disrupted often forcing the drones to emergency land or retreat.
Schiebel Camcopter S-100
The S-100 is a helicopter-type drone used in longer-range reconnaissance roles. It has a maximum take-off weight of 200kg with a payload of 50kg and possesses a maximum endurance of 10hrs*. Its usage by the SMM has been suspended between 2016 and 2018 due to frequent jamming incidents, forcing the UAV to return or emergency land. Interestingly, a Russian license-built version of the Schiebel drone exists in form of the Gorizont Air S-100, however even though regular trials are documented it is unclear whether the Russian system ever saw active usage.
*Note: All technical and performance data of the UAS according to manufacturer’s specifications. These may deviate considerably from the real-world performance.
How was drone defence approached?
Ukraine possesses electronic counter-UAS (/anti-drone) equipment. These include the handheld Drone Jamming Gauge SC01 with a range of 500m, the RF Detection and Jamming Equipment ZD02 with a range of up to 10km, a Drone Navigation Tricking System, an RF Jamming System, and another handheld Drone Jamming Gauge SC02 with a range of 1,000m. All those are considered part of the Bukovel-AD (anti-drone) system produced by the Ukrainian Proximus company.
The most reliable source of information on the ongoing counter-UAS warfare are the SMMs daily reports as quoted above. The SMM drones are constantly impeded in their efforts to observe what is happening in the area of operation by suspected interference from both the DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) and the Ukrainian military. The DPR is known to use Russian R-330M1P “Diabazol” and R-330Zh “Zhitel” systems, in the areas around Horlivka and Yenakiieve.
Those systems are generalized electronic warfare systems used to jam communications and satellite navigation frequencies, not specialized anti-drone systems. The Ukrainian Military has deployed the 305th electronic warfare battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with Bukovel-AD stations described above in the areas of Stepanovka and Bogdanovka and has seen success against the SMM drones. All sides, therefore, have the ability to disrupt drone operations.
Although Ukraine has intercepted several Orlan-10 drones, this number is probably insignificant compared to the number of missions flown. Considering that Orlan-10s are deployed in swarms of two to five drones, this furthermore means that after shooting down one drone, the others were usually able to escape, minimising the operational and economic impact for Russia. No information is available on how Ukraine approached the interception. Although the specialised equipment mentioned above may have been used, it is equally possible that these were low-flying drone swarms that could be intercepted with conventional weapons. In summary, this seems to imply that the systems used in this conflict may not be very effective against specialised military UAS or may not be widely available.
Russia has made counter-UAS training mandatory throughout its military. All major exercises are accompanied by simulated drone attacks to be countered with electronic warfare, air defence and more traditional methods like direct fire with small arms.
This not only enables the units involved in these exercises to repel UAS attacks in the field but also gives them the necessary psychological preparation to withstand drone attacks that cannot be intercepted.
Since Ukraine has not deployed drones in numbers that could seriously affect ongoing fighting, the effectiveness of this training cannot be assessed. The reports from Syria, where Russia was unable to repel Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, at least testify to the ineffectiveness of the larger Russian air defence systems against drones, although this again says nothing about their tactics and training as a whole.
In this conflict, there seems to be no definitive defence against drones, despite jamming and other electronic warfare efforts reported in the SMM’s incident reports. However, the existence of those efforts and their success against the outdated US UAVs shows that there is a baseline technological level drones need to pass to be used effectively in the conflict. Given the ongoing efforts to develop UAV and UCAV solutions, a parallel race to develop the most effective countermeasures would be advisable, but, as the increasingly effective use of drones not only in this conflict shows, is a much greater challenge.
Now what? Conclusion.
Drones are a definite force multiplier in modern warfare, in several ways. One of the principles of war is surprise, and this can only be achieved by those who have a better understanding of the battlefield. Drones not only provide commanders with a clear view of the battlefield but also an additional element that can be used to deliver operational or strategic strikes against priority targets at the touch of a button. Drones, more than any other military system, continue to provide the commander with the necessary link between the air, cyberspace and the other domains of warfare. If used in a distributed way, as is more and more common, all the same capabilities are offered to officers in the field, too.
In terms of the core objectives of military operations — to find, fix, track, target, attack, assess as well as and disrupt and threaten — drones are game-changers no longer reserved to countries with large defence budgets. The total destruction of the ammunition depot in Balakliya in particular shows how drones can be used to exploit vulnerabilities far behind the front lines with minimal risk to friendly forces.
The role that drones played in the initial attack may not have been decisive. Nevertheless, Ukraine has learned very quickly that drones are of great use in modern warfare. It was far behind in this area and has therefore embarked on a programme that has brought its drone forces to a much more effective level. Drones will play an important role not only in possible future Russian incursions in this conflict, but for global (semi-)symmetric warfare. However, an effective counter-UAS system could once again significantly change this aspect of modern warfare.
Now what? Recommendations
- Every soldier should acquire a basic knowledge of drones and their weapon systems, enabling them to at least try to defend against drones and to take passive defensive measures when all else fails. This also enables them to make creative offensive use of drones and develop innovative tactics.
- The development of anti-drone (counter-UAS) systems may be one of the most significant defensive projects any modern nation could currently undertake in military terms. Disabling the drone threat will hurt the chances of any aggressor and remove this modern force multiplier. Further operational advantages can be gained by accessing the data links of enemy drones to gather intelligence or take over control. This makes it possible to use an adversary’s weapons against them — an option that is either not possible with most other weapons systems, or at least not as effective as with drones.
- The development of UAVs and UCAVs should be a priority in every nation’s strategic planning. An effective drone force provides a significant deterrent to adversaries. In the event of a conflict, such drones can still act as force multipliers. As shown in this article and the one on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the use of drones increases the effectiveness of most other military options.
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