The age of drones has arrived in symmetrical armed conflict. What can we learn from this?
Drones: Disruptive Innovation, Literally
An analysis of and three lessons from the Azerbaijan-Armenia War 2020
Drones have severely impacted Western forces in ongoing asymmetric conflicts; Islamic State shopping lists have been found for amateur drones, easily armed with explosives, have been found. However, no major, symmetrical, war has been fought in which drones have been used as an innovative means of combat for a long time.
This changed in the 2020 Azerbaijani-Armenian war, commonly referred to as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The creative drone-based tactics employed by Azerbaijan enabled a complete disintegration of Armenian forces and rapid territorial gains. At the same time, defence against the deployed drones proved very difficult without special equipment.
The conflict has shown that the age of military drones has arrived at all levels, operational, tactical and strategic — at a much lower cost than other military innovations. Any military organisation that is not yet using drones extensively should keep a close eye on this.
This article has no political tendencies and is solely intended as an analysis of the depicted conflict. A loss of human life on every side is always tragic and should be avoided at all costs.
Background and international sales of drones
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic and territorial confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The status of this region has been disputed since 1918 when both countries declared independence from the Russian Empire.
This dispute was only hidden during Soviet times. After the dissolution of the Soviet Republic in 1991, fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Although a cease-fire has been in place since May 1994, it is regularly broken as Thomas de Waal shows in his critically acclaimed history of the region over the decades, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of soldiers and civilians. Azerbaijan’s recent economic diversification and oil revenues gave the country a huge advantage that allowed it to diversify its foreign arms purchases.
Israel was Azerbaijan’s top trading partner in arms imports in 2015–2019. According to the World Bank, its share in Azerbaijan’s arms imports in the above period was 60%, while Russia contributed 31% and Turkey 3.2%. The remaining percentage was divided between Ukraine, Belarus, Pakistan, and China. This allowed Azerbaijan to modernize its arsenal and purchases amounted to roughly 2.3 billion during this time.
Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been close for a long time; the number of exercises involving the armies of both countries and involving all types of troops is growing every year. In 2013, there were seven such events, which eventually increased to 13 in 2019. In the first nine months of 2020, Azerbaijan’s arms imports from the Turkish defence and aviation sectors amounted to $123 million.
During July-September 2020, Azerbaijan conducted a series of military exercises involving Turkish ground and air forces, which likely strengthened Azerbaijan’s perceived power and determination to end the Karabakh conflict in its favour.
In addition to providing general military training and equipment to Azerbaijan’s military, Turkey also began exporting drones to Azerbaijan; possibly other equipment, too.
These drones were used to trigger the latest open conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia on September 27. Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) flew over the disputed area and destroyed or disabled at least six older Russian-made Osa and Strela mobile surface-to-air missile systems. These systems appeared unable to track or counter the drones, as did newer Russian-made Pantsir-S1s in Syria and Libya.
This use of Turkish drones in an all-out conflict forced supplier countries to ban or at least critically review the sale of certain components to Turkey. These include Canadian-made sensors and laser sights, as well as German-made and Swiss-made equipment. However, the emphasis with which Turkey is building its local drone industry suggests that the bans will result in only one thing: The emergence of national supply chains and reduced dependence on foreign countries.
Turkey denies any direct involvement in the conflict. Thomas De Waal, nevertheless notes:
The decisive factor in this conflict is clearly Turkey’s intervention on Azerbaijan’s side. They appear to be coordinating the war effort to a great extent.
Azerbaijan’s rapid early territorial gains in this conflict appear to be largely due to the innovative use of drones provided by Israel and Turkey.
The conflict lasted about six weeks and ended on November 10, 2020, with a cease-fire and peace agreement brokered again by Russia.
Types of Drones Used by the Azerbaijan Military
Before diving into the conflict proper, it is useful to get an overview of the drones used by the Azerbaijani side of the conflict. These are mostly medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with heavy use of the notable outliers TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) and Harop-Loitering munitions. All vehicle information is sourced from public manufacturer material.
Kale-Baykar Bayraktar TB2 MALE UCAV
The main type of drone used by Azerbaijan during the conflict. Is armed with MAM-L laser-guided mini smart ammunition and was used both in reconnaissance as well as combat roles. The drone has a length of 6.5m, a wingspan of 12m and a maximum take-off weight of 650kg. It has a range of more than 150km, can fly at a maximum altitude of 27,000ft, has a maximum speed ranging between 70kt and 120kt and an endurance of 27 hours.
Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) Anka MALE UAV
Not armed and heavily used in a reconnaissance role. Anka has a length of 8m, a wingspan of 17.3m and a maximum take-off weight of 1,600kg. It has a range of more than 1400km, can fly at a maximum altitude of 30,000ft, has a maximum speed of approx. 120kt and an endurance of 24 hours.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Heron-TP MALE UAV
Not armed and used in a long-term surveillance role. The Heron-TP has a length of 8.5m, a wingspan of 16.6m and a maximum take-off weight of is 1,150kg. It has a range of more than 2000km, can fly at a maximum altitude of 33,000ft, has a maximum speed of approx. 110kt and an endurance of 52 hours.
Elbit Systems Hermes 900 MALE UAV
Not armed and used in a reconnaissance role. The Hermes-900 has a length of 8.3m, a wingspan of 15m and a maximum take-off weight of is 1,180kg. It has a range of more than 2000km, can fly at a maximum altitude of 30,000ft, has a maximum speed of approx. 120kt and an endurance of 36 hours.
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Harop Loitering Munitions
Loitering munitions, sharing characteristics with UCAVs, smart munitions and small cruise missiles, loiter around the target area for some time, search for targets, and attack once a target is located. Harop was used multiple times during the conflict and was praised for its effectiveness by Azerbaijan top officials. It has a length of 2.5m and a wingspan of 3m. It carries a 16kg or 23kg warhead and, while having a 200km communications range, can fly for 1000km.
Antonov AN-2 Drone-Converted Biplane
One remarkable use of drones was the conversion of old Antonov AN-2 biplanes to an unmanned version. It was not used for combat or reconnaissance, but rather as a decoy. By flying over Armenian territory and forcing Armenian air defences to fire on this potentially armed enemy target, it was used as a cheap way to uncover hidden air defences.
Independent research has not turned up any evidence of advanced autopiloting systems in the wreckages, however. One explanation could be that the Antonovs were merely pilotless, with a human pilot performing the take-off, locking the control input devices to set the aircraft on a more or less straight path and then exiting the aircraft with a parachute. In any case, however, this shows that obsolete technology, creatively used, can have a significant tactical impact.
Notable Tactics Used by the Azerbaijan Military
In the early stages of the conflict, Azerbaijan used several Soviet-era Antonov AN-2 aircraft converted into drones and sent them to circle over Nagorno-Karabakh as decoys. This was to entice Armenian air defences to fire and give away their positions, whereupon they could be hit by other drones — a surprising use for completely obsolete aircraft.
In later stages of the conflict, Azerbaijan used surveillance drones to spot targets and sent UCAVs or loitering munitions to destroy them, using drone strike strategies learned from Turkey through participation in joint military exercises with the Turkish Air Force in Azerbaijan and Turkish airspace in the summer of 2020.
Azerbaijan probably benefited from Turkey’s experience of its recent use of drones in Syria as well as Libya, where its drones completely invalidated the Russian made Pantsir S1 air defence systems used by the forces of ex-general and current warlord Chalifa Haftar in May 2020.
Drones were used in all phases of the conflict and worked closely with other drones and with ground and air forces. They were closely linked to the tactical level of combat, providing targeting information and reconnaissance. They were used to instil fear and insecurity in Armenian ground forces, who felt they could be hit at any time, anywhere.
The use of even heavily armoured vehicles has been disrupted or prevented by the use of drones, including smaller ones, either by allowing Azerbaijani forces to hit the vehicles with long-range strike options such as artillery or by attacking them directly when detected by UCAVs or loitering munitions.
Drones even had critical effects on rear Armenian supply lines and penetrated deep into guarded territory because they were too small, or even, as in the case of Harop loitering munitions, specifically designed to be too stealthy, to be detected by classical air defence radars.
Effectiveness of Drone Usage During the Conflict
The combat effectiveness of drones is demonstrated by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a remarkable way. Due to the tactics used by Azerbaijan, such as the use of unmanned biplanes, the use of stealth reconnaissance drones, etc., which often provided direct photo and video footage, Azerbaijani news was able to write detailed lists of destroyed and captured vehicles from both sides.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence list includes only destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photographic or video evidence is available. Therefore, as the Azerbaijani President notes, the amount of destroyed equipment is undoubtedly higher than recorded, as small arms, ammunition, abandoned vehicles, and non-strategic targets such as checkpoints are not included in this list.
According to Oryx, an excellent open-source intelligence blog by Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, the list of vehicles destroyed, damaged, or captured by Azerbaijan through the use of drones, which may mean direct destruction by UCAVs or loitering munitions, relay of targeting information, or simply providing an updated picture of the scene during engagements, is very long indeed. In addition to that, drones were also used in hitting 22 strategic targets.
The list could not be independently verified; however, the loss numbers seem to be much higher on the Armenian side than for the Azerbaijanis. Even without fully analysing the individual vehicles in this list it shows the massive value drones can provide during traditional conflicts.
Defence Against Drones Without Specialized Equipment
The Armenian military hinted at secret weapons that could be used to prevent drones from flying over their territory, which was interpreted at the time as some kind of Russian equipment. Even before the conflict, Armenia trained in joint exercises with Russia on how to repel drones:
However: as has been demonstrated in this conflict, ordinary air defence systems do not appear to be able to defend against drones because they are designed to detect larger signatures, even in the case of more modern systems than those used in this conflict. Specialized equipment, despite the hints to secret weapons and the joint Russian-Armenian training initiative, seems to have been absent. The only remaining option was to try to hit the drones manually with anti-aircraft weapons or even smaller arms, a tactic that did not prove very effective, as evidenced by the large casualty numbers with drone involvement.
Worse still: As the drones seemingly could not be detected by classical air defence radars, easy reconnaissance of their positions on the ground by reconnaissance drones was possible. Afterwards, they could be hit by long-range artillery or other drones.
Therefore, specialized counter-drone equipment appears to be required to identify and engage smaller drones, depending on the altitude at which they fly. Without it, defence is difficult to impossible.
Conclusion
Drones are force multipliers in roles ranging from reconnaissance to forward defence. Due to inherent characteristics such as small size and by manoeuvring at very low altitudes, they can evade ordinary air defence assets designed against traditional aircraft and larger missiles.
Looking at Azerbaijan reports on the conflict, MALE drones and small drones could take out a wide range of enemy targets that include heavily armoured vehicles, signal jammers, decoy systems, and radar systems. In addition to their use at the front line, drones seemed to critically impact rear supply lines and logistics, both of which usually are especially visible to open terrain.
The drone-supported destruction of twenty-two Armenian strategic sites, including Stepanakert airport and a local radio mast, indicates that unmanned aerial vehicles have become basic support equipment for a modern army, with capabilities ranging from the strategic to the tactical and operational level.
It is particularly interesting to note that most of the drones used were not extremely sophisticated by modern standards, incorporating neither stealth features nor electronic countermeasures as far as is known. There was no need for perfect integration of all vehicles and elements of the conflict in terms of a system-of-systems, (almost) no high-tech stealth drones were used, and most of the equipment used was more or less bought off the shelf:
The decisive factor in this conflict was not the most futuristic technology — it was drone technology itself and its creative use at all levels of the conflict.
Recommendations
Based on the analysis of this conflict, there are three recommendations that should be implemented in the armed forces of each country:
- Every soldier should acquire at least a basic knowledge of drones and their weapon systems to enable creative use and innovation of tactics. This also prepares them mentally to take protective action if they encounter drones in the field.
- The use of drones, from the operational to the strategic level, by military organisations should become the norm because of their flexibility, the element of surprise and the increase in safety for their own soldiers. Their use should be intensively trained across forces in international joint exercises. Drones are also a clear combat force multiplier in unarmed reconnaissance missions, so this recommendation is independent of the general debate on armed drones that is ongoing in some countries (e.g. Germany).
- Specialised equipment for drone defence and specific electronic warfare is needed as soon as possible, not only for fixed bases but also for convoys and even at platoon level. Due to the frequent operational and technical innovations in drones, drone defence systems need to be continuously modernised and tested, and their deployment trained.
You might also be interested in how drones were used in the Crimean conflict.
Any thoughts on this topic? Get in touch on LinkedIn!
